Thus the main problem of monitoring could not be processed

The European Commission will make its copy on the remodeling of the surveillance-spear and macroeconomic coordination in the euro area on 29 September, the "task force" Van Rompuy on 29 October. Despite the diagnosis today largely shared the failure of the stability and Growth Pact to ensure the sustainability of public finances in the euro area, opinions differ on what to do, so that it is feared a compromise insufficiently ambitious for the euro area from a new crisis.

The General objectives are not at issue: it is both to strengthen the stability pact, so that it is better respected, and broadening macroeconomic surveillance across the imbalances of each economy - not only in the strictly budgetary field. It is what are attached to the two working groups, mainly from two angles: primo, a "European semester" in which, each year, the budget and broader macroeconomic policies of each Member State will be examined by the Commission and the Council before the vote by the national Parliament. Secondly, a strengthening of the sanctions against the offenders to the Covenant.

After the Council of 16 September, it seems that the proposals offer no radical break with the existing procedure, but failed. If the "European semester" can create the conditions for a "European Government" early, with greater attention to the national guidelines, you can still fear a lack of practical commitment of States to genuine budgetary governance.

First, the enlargement of the macroeconomic monitoring is with no new coercion device: the threat of sanctions remains reserved for the area strictly budget, while drift, such as the competitiveness of a country is just the subject of reports and meetings, differing fundamentally, the device of current coordination (monitoring via the broad economic policy guidelines), which has never been truly mobilized by the Council. Budgetary sanctions themselves are not fundamentally redesigned.

Then, the delicate question of possible restructuring of sovereign debt is not mentioned. We understand the prudence of European leaders on this dangerous issue. However, the markets continue to assign a probability high a partial devaluation of certain sovereign debt in the euro area. Would recognize officially this eventuality encourage States more than discipline and markets to lend more rigorously to the States. Now that the stability is (almost) operational, that the ECB acts as lender of last resort and that the "stress tests" have increased financial transparency, the risk of contagion are more limited, even if they have obviously not disappeared.

Finally and most importantly, the Council remains at the centre of the monitoring device: it is for him to trigger sanctions by vote of the majority (out of the country in question). But it will be difficult at a meeting of Finance Ministers to sanction one of them, especially when it represents a great country and especially when other thorny issues (the common agricultural policy, the fiscal Outlook) are also under discussion.

Thus, the main problem of monitoring could not be processed. A track would be for example to create incentives to discipline, potentially more effective than sanctions. Delpla and von Weizsäcker and proposed a mechanism for sharing of sovereign emissions in 60 of GDP limit, each country to fend alone with the markets to raise funds beyond this limit, at a rate strongly differentiated according to the level of debt. Other mechanisms of incentives could be envisaged, for example by making variable part of the European disbursements in respect of regional and cohesion fund.

Another track would be to preserve budgetary sovereignty while empowering the States the European consequences of their national actions on the model of which is in place for financial supervision: European authorities with a certain independence and based on the expertise of national authorities they also independent.